When (true) disagreement gives out by Stojanovic, Isidora
When (true) disagreement gives out
Isidora Stojanovic
To cite this version:
Isidora Stojanovic. When (true) disagreement gives out. to appear in a special issue of the
Croatian Journal of Philosophy. 2011. <ijn 00599209>
HAL Id: ijn 00599209
http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn 00599209
Submitted on 8 Jun 2011
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
When (true) disagreement gives out
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(to appear in a special issue of the Croatian Journal of Philosophy 
on Mark Richard's When Truth Gives Out)
Abstract
In this paper, I take issue with the proposal put forward by Mark Richard in When  
Truth Gives Out (2008) concerning disputes over issues such as who is rich, what is 
cool, and other issues of similar ilk. Richard holds that the parties in the dispute can 
truly disagree on whether a given person is rich, but can be both right, if we assume 
that  they  have  different  standards  of  wealth,.  Disputes  over  what  is  cool  are, 
according  to  Richard,  trickier,  since  they  can  give  rise  to  cases  of  faultless 
disagreement in which the two parties disagree, and neither party is wrong, but 
neither party is right either! My first goal in this paper will be to show that the 
distinction between the two types of disagreement, as drawn by Richard, is not well 
motivated.  I  will  also  argue  that  if  he  were  right  about  the  stronger  case 
(disagreement  in  which  both  parties  are  right),  his  own  account  would  fail  to 
capture it. He can capture either the idea that they truly disagree, or the idea that  
they are both right; but he cannot both have his cake and eat it, too. 
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My second goal will be to bring to the foreground some constructive aspects of 
Richard's  proposal,  and  in  particular  the  idea  that  such  disagreements  involve 
concepts  whose  application is  not  fully  determined  and  whose  usage  is  open to 
accommodation and negotiation (to use Lewis's  terms, as used by Richard). If  we 
accept that on some occasions,  whether a concept applies to a given instance or 
doesn't  is not yet settled, then arguably there are cases in which neither party is 
wrong – at least at the time of the dispute. I argue that their disagreement can be 
genuine only to the extent that it will eventually be settled whether the concept is to 
apply to a given instance or not, hence the way in which the concept gets shaped up 
and extended through its future uses makes it possible to determine, retrospectively, 
which of the two parties got it right. If this is correct, then the putative cases of  
faultless disagreement really turn upon the openness of the future: what makes them 
“faultless” is, simply, that there isn't any matter of fact  yet  whether the one or the 
other party is right.               
Sect. I Richard on disagreement and truth
Richard’s When Truth Gives Out develops around the idea that the notion of truth, 
contrary to a lot of received wisdom from philosophy of language and logic, is not — 
or at least, not always — the right concept to employ in analyzing belief, assertion, 
or  their  evaluation.  The  book's  five  chapters  could  have  worked equally  well  as 
independent  essays,  but  the  choice  of  compiling those  pieces  into  a  monograph, 
rather than a mere collection of essays,  is motivated by the fact that each chapter 
addresses, sometimes in different ways and from different angles, the question of 
whether the notions of truth and falsity should be central to the analysis of a range 
of phenomena regarding thought, discourse, inference and disagreement. The take-
home message of the book is that if one is prepared to give up the centrality of the 
notion of truth — whether one trades it for the notion of  relative  truth or, more 
radically, decides that even relative truth is not the right dimension to understand 
belief and assertion — then one can start perceiving promising solutions to several 
long-standing puzzles from philosophy of language, logic and epistemology.
In this paper, I will be exclusively concerned with the last two chapters: Ch. IV, 
When (true) disagreement gives out 2 Isidora Stojanovic
What's  the Matter  with Relativism?  (which largely overlaps with Richard's  2004 
paper) and, to a lesser extent, Ch. V,  Matters of Taste. In both chapters, Richard is 
concerned with the issue of disagreement: in Ch. IV, he addresses the question  of 
how  there  can  be  disagreement  over  the  issue  of  whether  a  given  object  or 
individual  has  a  given  property  (such  as  the  property  of  being  rich),  yet 
disagreement  in  which  both  of  the  parties  seem  to  be  right  (or,  on  a  weaker 
construal, neither party is wrong); in Ch. V, he turns to disagreement over matters of 
taste, e.g. whether vegemite is tasty or whether Ethan Hawke is attractive, where the 
intuition  that  neither  party  is  wrong  is,  one  may  think,  even  stronger.  Richard 
believes that there is a neat distinction between the two types of cases; I believe that 
he is wrong in that respect. But before I go on to articulate my concerns regarding 
the distinction that he wants to draw, and, more importantly, regarding the account 
itself  that he  is proposing,  let  us first  get  clear  about  the  account  itself,  and the  
motivations on which it relies.
In Ch. IV, Richard presents his core example: Didi and Naomi’s disagreement 
as to whether Mary, who won a million-dollar lottery, is rich. Didi holds that she is 
rich, while Naomi, for whom a million dollars is not that much, holds that she is not. 
He then points out that since Didi and Naomi happen to have different standards of 
wealth, there seems to be no objective way of adjudicating between Didi and Naomi. 
It should be noted that the predicate 'rich' is a gradable adjective, and Richard 
is aware that gradable adjectives are sensitive to contextual variations: if Didi says 
that Mary is rich in a conversation about life conditions in derelict suburbs of some 
very poor country, while Naomi says that she is not rich in a conversation about Bill  
Gates and Donald Trump, then it becomes easy (at least from the point of view of the 
standard semantic accounts of gradable adjectives)1 to account for the idea that both 
Didi and Naomi may be right. The gradable adjectives’ dependence on the so-called 
comparison class is no news, and can be assimilated in a fairly straightforward way 
to  familiar  forms of  context-dependence,  like  indexicality.  Thus e.g.  if  I  say  ‘It’s 
raining’ in Paris, and you say ‘It’s not raining’ in New York, we can obviously both 
speak truth. But Richard insists that the phenomenon that he is interested in is not 
dependence on a comparison class, and that it cannot be assimilated to any form of 
indexicality. For, he argues, when the comparison classes are different, we loose the 
intuition of disagreement, to the same extent that we have no such intuition if I say 
1 See e.g. Kamp (1975), and, more recently, Kennedy and McNally (2005), Kennedy (2007).
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that it’s raining and you say that it isn’t, but I am in Paris and you are in New York. 
Indeed, Naomi might well accept that Mary is rich relative to the population of those 
derelict suburbs, and that,  at the same time, she is not rich compared to Trump, 
Gates, etc. Richard’s scenario is, by assumption, one in which “the salient comparison 
class is the same in both cases (it is, say, New Yorkers)” (p. 93). The reason why we 
can fix the comparison class  and still  be unable to adjudicate between Didi  and 
Naomi is that each person places the threshold demarcating the rich from the non-
rich at a different level of the richness scale. Naomi’s threshold is below one million 
dollar, while Didi’s is further up.
Now, gradable adjectives’ dependence on a threshold point  in addition to  a 
comparison class (or an ordered class, that is, a scale) is no news either. Whether or 
not  Richard,  noticeably  parsimonious  in  his  references  to  the  vast  literature  on 
adjectives and vagueness, was aware that the importance of thresholds had been 
previously  acknowledged,  one  should  grant  him the  insight  that  thresholds  and 
comparison classes, qua parameters on which truth value depends, are not on a par.2 
While Naomi may consistently say ‘Mary is rich in comparison with inhabitants of 
derelict suburbs, but isn't rich in comparison with millionaires,’ it would be odd for 
her to say ‘Mary is rich for a New Yorker relative to a  threshold set  below one 
million, but is not rich for a New Yorker relative to a threshold set further up.’ To 
put the same point differently, one can be tall for an ordinary person without being 
tall  for  a  basketball  player,  but one either is  or  isn't  tall  for  a  basketball  player. 
Whether one is tall for a basketball player requires, of course, fixing a cut-off point 
within the tallness scale (as restricted to the class of basketball players). But once the 
comparison class is fixed, one cannot go on playing around with thresholds (or, at 
least, not with the same flexibility with which one can play around with comparison 
classes). So, summing up, when F is an adjective such as ‘tall’ or ‘rich,’ in order to 
interpret  the claim that F  applies to some object X,  one must first determine the 
relevant comparison class.  Parties who disagree whether X is F,  while relying on 
different comparison classes, are only engaged in spurious disagreement. This does 
not seem to hold for threshold-dependence. When Naomi and Didi disagree whether 
Mary is rich for a New Yorker, the interpretation is not at issue. Each understands 
2 Of course, Richard himself does not put his point in these terms. Indeed, it is unclear whether he 
would even accept the idea that when one spells out the truth clause for a gradable adjective, one 
would include a threshold parameter, in addition to the comparison class parameter. Nevertheless, I 
think that my construal of Richard's view gives us helpful means of tracking what is going on.   
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what the other is claiming, there is no misunderstanding of any sort, and yet, we 
seem to lack objective grounds on which to adjudicate between them, to decide that 
the one rather  than the  other  got  the facts  right.  From the point of  view of  the 
standards that Naomi is adopting, she is right and Didi is wrong, while from the 
point of view of the standards that Didi is adopting, she is right and Naomi is wrong. 
But if both can be simultaneously right and wrong, then (absolute) truth must give 
out!
Now, how can there be genuine, substantive disagreement that is not cashed 
out in terms of truth and falsity? Richard’s answer is twofold. First, Didi and Naomi’s 
disagreement is substantive because they share all the concepts involved in the issue 
over which they disagree, and, in particular, the concept denoted by the predicate 
‘rich.’ To illustrate the point, suppose that Mary is a dentist, and Didi says ‘Mary is 
good’ while Naomi says ‘Mary is not good.’ If Didi means to be saying that Mary is a  
good dentist, while Naomi means to be saying that Mary is not a (morally) good 
person, then their uses of the predicate ‘good’ arguably denote different concepts, 
and their disagreement is merely verbal, rather than substantive. Secondly, it is not 
necessary, according to Richard, that either of the disagreeing parties should get the 
facts right and latch onto truth. In the picture that he proposes, there is a certain 
concept in place, the concept of being rich, but the extension of the concept, i.e. the 
range of individuals to which the concept applies, is not determined by the concept 
itself (together with the facts). Rather, it is, as one might say, open-ended, and gets 
more and more determined as the concept starts getting entrenched in a linguistic 
community. Here are two excerpts from Ch. IV that suggest such an interpretation: 
“Because ‘rich’ is subject to accommodation, speakers in different conversations (...)  
are able to impose different extensions (and thus intensions) on ‘rich’; the result is 
that different speaker’s uses of ‘Mary is rich’ can have different truth-values” (p.  
100) 
“What a concept or notion is a concept or notion of gets worked out over time via 
something like a process of cultural accommodation and negotiation” (p. 116). 
In other words, accommodation and negotiation are processes that make room 
for a notion of disagreement that falls in between, on the one hand, merely verbal 
disagreement  and,  on  the  other,  merely  factual  disagreement;  a  notion  of 
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disagreement  that  is  arguably  substantial,  yet  overrides  the  dimension  of  purely 
extensional notions such as truth and falsity.
In Ch. V, Richard is still concerned with disagreement, but turns his attention 
to disagreements over what is cool, who is hot, wh good-looking, what is yummy, 
and so on, and suggests that ‘judgments about what is cool and other matters of taste 
enjoy a  double relativity’  (p. 132, my italics). Consider our disagreement over the 
issue of  whether some person,  e.g.  Ethan Hawke, is attractive.  We can both give 
reasons and arguments that support our respective judgments. That would suffice to 
make our disagreement substantive, yet there seems to be no objective basis to say 
that the one rather than the other got the facts right. From my perspective, Hawke is 
attractive, from yours, he is not, and the reason why, under this scenario, it makes 
sense to continue arguing about the issue is that our shared concept of attractiveness 
is subject to accommodation and negotiation; we would have, again, the same sort of 
relativity as the one discussed in Chapter IV concerning disagreement over who is 
rich and who isn't. But Richard now points out that ‘not only may the assignment of 
a truth-value to a claim be ‘perspective-relative,’ but whether a claim is truth-apt 
may also be ‘perspective-relative’ “ (p. 126). The idea is that unlike judging whether 
Mary  is  rich,  which  precludes,  in  Richard's  view,  that  the  disagreeing  parties 
themselves may recognize that they may be relying on different standards of weath, 
and that consequently the other party need not be wrong, when we judge whether 
Hawke  is  attractive,  we  are  not  so  much  making  judgments  that  he  is  or  isn't 
attractive,  as judgments (or reports,  if  you prefer) that we find him attractive or 
don't.  Here  is  an  excerpt  from  the  Introduction  in  which  Richard  stresses  the 
distinction: 
“[W]hile we recognize that we may disagree about these thing [who is handsome,  
who sexy,  what  is  hip,  etc.],  we also  acknowledge  that  in  (some)  such  matters  
neither of those who disagree need be making a mistake. And this is not something  
that the relativist – at least not the relativist of Chapter 4 – thinks possible. If Didi 
thinks Mary is rich, and Naomi thinks that Mary is not rich, Didi thinks that Naomi 
is wrong, for Didi thinks it's false that Mary is rich.” (p. 10) 
Richard's goal in Ch. V is, in sum, to make room for a notion of disagreement in 
which we disagree, yet we allow that the persons with whom we disagree “are not 
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making a mistake about the matter” (p. 11). 
Sect. II Disagreeing with Richard
As we have just seen in the last section, Richard wants to distinguish between two 
types of faultless disagreement: those whose paradigmatic example is the case of Didi 
and Naomi debating whether Mary is rich, in which (i) they truly disagree, (ii) they 
are both right (from their own perspectives), and (iii) they both believe that the other 
is wrong; and, secondly, those whose paradigmatic case are disputes over matters of 
taste,  over  who is  attractive  and what  is  cool,  in which (i)  the two parties  truly 
disagree, (ii) they are both right (from their own perspectives), and (iii) they do not 
believe that the other is either wrong or mistaken in any other respect. For the ease  
of  exposition,  let  us  call  the  former  'rich'  disagreements,  and  the  latter,  'cool'  
disagreements. Now, my first problem with Richard's view (at least as presented in 
his book) is that he does not really argue for this distinction, nor does he argue for  
the idea that only disagreements over matters of taste can be 'cool'. (I take it, on the 
other hand, that he accepts that in certain cases, disagreements on what is cool can 
give rise to 'rich' disagreement: for instance, if I were to learn that you believe that it  
is cool to intimidate students who lack self-confidence, I would certainly think that 
you are wrong – and very much so).      
Why  should  cool  disagreements  only  arise  with  judgments  of  taste?  Why 
should it be implausible, for instance, to hold that Didi’s evaluation of Mary as rich 
might be of the same kind as my evaluation of Hawke as attractive? In either case, 
the  agent  would  be  simply  asserting  her  own perspective,  to  use  a  phrase  from 
Lasersohn (2005), rather than making a “truth-apt” judgment to the effect that Mary 
is rich or that Hawke is attractive. In putting forward the distinction, Richard merely 
relies on the assumption that the reader will share his intuitions. But this is far from 
obvious. Let's forget for the moment about Didi, Naomi and Mary, and consider the 
issue whether I, with my little salary of a French academic, am rich. I (and most of 
the people I know) would judge that I am not rich.3 But I would also understand that 
from the point of view of someone who lives in misery – say,  who lives without 
3 We wouldn't judge that I am poor either, but rather, somewhere on the borderline (towards its lower 
end, I'm afraid).   
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electricity and running water – I am rich. And were such a person to express their 
judgment, I would even find it inappropriate to argue with them whether I am rich 
or not – even though I still firmly believe that I am not.4 In other words, just as I may, 
to use Richard's jargon, 'acknowledge as acceptable' the perspective of someone who 
doesn't  think that  Ethan Hawke is  attractive,  I  may  equally  well  acknowledge as 
acceptable  the perspective of someone who thinks that I am rich (even though I am 
not), or, for that matter, the perspective of someone who thinks that I am poor (even 
though I am not).   
To bring the point home, what I am objecting here to Richard is that he didn't 
give us any criteria to decide when a disagreement is 'cool' as opposed to 'rich': he 
has simply relied on intuitions that turn out to be rather shaky. Now, interestingly, 
there is a more robust difference between disagreeing whether people are rich vs. 
whether they are attractive. It is the fact that when we turn to the comparative form, 
disagreement evaporates in the one case but persists in the other.5 Thus while Naomi 
and Didi may disagree whether Mary is rich simpliciter, they will not at all disagree 
whether Mary is richer than Khaled (assuming each knows what Mary and Khaled 
own respectively). On the other hand, people will disagree not only whether Hawke 
is  attractive  simpliciter,  but  also,  whether  he  is  more  attractive  than,  say,  Javier 
Bardem. So  I  am not  denying that  there  may  be  interesting differences  between 
matters of taste and other matters.6 Rather, what I am objecting to Richard is that he 
fails to spell them out properly. What is more, assuming that, as noted above, he is 
willing to accept that in certain cases of disagreement over taste, the parties in the 
dispute do take one another to be wrong, then the two types of disagreement ('rich'  
vs.  'cool')  simply  cut  across  the  distinction  between  disagreement  over  taste  vs. 
disagreement over something else.
4 Someone might want to say that in the scenario I have described, the reason why I can consistently 
think that I am not rich and that from the point of view of someone who lives in misery, I am rich, is 
that the comparison classes are different. I don't think that this would resolve the issue, for we can 
make the case such that it is clear that the relevant comparison class is everyone on the planet.  
5 This feature has been emphasized in the linguistic literature on predicates of personal taste; see e.g. 
Glanzberg (2007) and Anand (ms.). Another linguistic feature that distinguishes predicates of taste 
from other predicates is the felicity with which they can occur in 'find'-constructions. Thus “Naomi 
finds Hawke attractive” is 100% good, while “Naomi finds Mary rich” is bad (although “Naomi 
finds Mary to be rich” is acceptable).   
6 It is nevertheless doubtful that the distinction as it arises in the comparative case can account for the 
distinction that Richard seeks to bring to light. For, some of the paradigmatic predicates of personal 
taste are not even gradable – thus, something either is or isn't delicious, but normally, you wouldn't 
say that one thing is “more delicious” than another. In French, at any rate, the adjective 'délicieux' 
does not allow for comparison. (I am grateful to my student François Le Corre for this observation.) 
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In the remainder of the paper, I will concentrate on 'rich' disagreement cases. 
For those cases, Richard seems to slide back and forth between two sorts of account 
(that he presumably takes to be complementing each other):
(i) a  relativist  account, on which Naomi and Didi disagree because the one 
asserts what the other denies (viz. that Mary is rich); nevertheless, they can be both 
right, because relative to the one's standards, Mary is rich, and relative to the other's 
standards, she isn't.7  
(ii) a  contextualist-à-la-Lewis  account,8 on which the disagreement between 
Didi and Naomi presupposes that they have a certain concept in common, denoted 
by the predicate 'rich', but the exact extension of this concept is not fully determined 
yet and remains open to accommodation and negotiation.      
In the remainder of this section, I will discuss and criticize the account in (i),9 
leaving the more plausible account in (ii) for the next section. But let me first quote 
some passages from Richard (one from the book and one from a recent paper) that 
illustrate the relativist line of his proposal:
“Didi and Naomi disagree. So there is something that Didi says and Naomi denies.  
Within the confines of each woman's conversation, each use of 'is rich' is correct.  
So Didi says something true in her context when she utters 'Mary is rich', Naomi 
says something true in hers when she utters the sentence's denial. This is consistent  
with the two disagreeing over the truth of a single claim, if the truth of the claim 
may be relative.” (2008, p. 99) 
“You think Mary is rich, I think your criteria for wealth are defective and that in  
fact Mary is not rich. Thinking that my criteria are better than yours, I think that 
7 Richard is clearly aware that this cannot be the end of the story, hence his endeavor to complement 
the proposal with a story about concepts being open to accommodation and negotiation. However, 
other “relativists” are sometimes less cautious. Thus Lasersohn, despite a number of criticisms to 
the account proposed in Lasersohn (2005), still writes: “If two contexts have different judges, (...) 
the sentence and its negation could both be true (relative to their separate contexts). This allows us 
an explanation of faultless disagreement: two sentences can express mutually contradictory 
contents, yet both be true relative to different individuals” (2009, my italics). 
8 The term 'contextualism' is one of the most versatile philosophical terms nowadays, and it can be 
quite misleading to talk of contextualism vs. relativism, since there are a number of different issues 
at stake, so that certain views can be said to be both 'contextualist' and 'relativist', depending on the 
issue that one has in mind (for discussion, see Stojanovic (2008)). The sense in which Richard's 
proposal is contextualist comes closest to the one in which the proposal in Lewis (1979) is. Note 
that a similar remark of caution may be made regarding the term 'relativism'. Indeed, relativism in 
the sense of (i), which is arguably Richard's relativism, is very different from, for instance, the 
relativism of MacFarlane (ms.).     
9 I have laid out an earlier version of this line of criticism, albeit directed at the proposals given in 
Kölbel (2002) and Lasersohn (2005), in Stojanovic (2007).    
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your belief  ought  be evaluated relative  to my criteria.  In such a case it  will  be 
sensible  for  me to evaluate  your  belief  relative  to them. In  a case  like  this—in 
which there is single perspective relative to which it is sensible to evaluate both 
your belief that Mary is rich and my belief that she is not—we disagree. To say that 
x and y disagree is to say that there is a content p such that one of x and y believes  
it, the other believes its denial, and there is a circumstance relative to which it is 
appropriate to evaluate both x’s belief and y’s belief.” (2011, p. 6). 
Setting aside some subtle changes in Richard's view, my immediate aim is to 
convince you that this sort of proposal cannot give you the sort of disagreement that 
Richard was after; namely, one in which we truly disagree, but are both right. My 
argument may be fragmented down as follows: 
1) Suppose, as Richard does, that the content of belief and assertion can have 
different truth values when evaluated relative to different perspectives.
2) Suppose furthermore, as Richard does, too (as is fairly clear from the second 
quote above) that Didi and Naomi are aware of this feature of the semantics of terms 
such as 'rich' – namely, that such a content needs to be evaluated at some perspective 
in order to have a truth value.
3) Suppose furthermore that in asserting that Mary is rich, Didi aims at saying 
something true, and that similarly, in asserting that she isn't, Naomi aims at saying 
something true.
4) From (2) and (3), it follows that in asserting that Mary is rich, Didi must 
intend her claim to be evaluated for truth at some specific perspective; similarly for 
Naomi.10
5) Suppose that Didi intends both hers and Naomi's claim to be evaluated with 
respect to her own perspective, while Naomi intends both hers and Didi's claim to be 
evaluated with respect to her own perspective. 
6) Recall that, given (2), both Didi and Naomi are aware that contents of this 
sort can have different truth values relative to different perspectives – so it's not as if  
Didi thought that her perspective was the only perspective at which such a content 
can be reasonably evaluated; and similarly for Naomi.
 
10 One reason for including the recent passage is, precisely, to show that Richard endorses the idea that 
speakers who assert perspective-relative contents also have beliefs (and, I would add, intentions) as 
to the perspective relative to which the content should be evaluated.    
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Conclusion 1. I submit that, under the assumption in (5), and the clarification 
in (6), the disagreement between Didi and Naomi is on a par with the disagreement 
that they would express were Didi to say “From my perspective, Mary is rich” and 
were  Naomi  to  reply,  “From  mine,  she  isn't”.  Admittedly,  there  is  a  sense  of 
'disagreement'  on  which  we  disagree  if  we  simply  state  that  we  have  different 
standards of weath and different perspectives on the issue of who should count as 
'rich'  and  who  shouldn't.  But  I  contend  that  this  is  a  much  weaker  sense  of 
disagreement than the one that Richard had been pursuing from the start. When the 
two parties assert  perspectival  claims that they intend to be evaluated relative to 
their  own  respective  perspectives,  it  seems  correct  to  say  that  genuine,  true  
disagreement gives out.   
Conclusion 2. Drop (5) and suppose, on the other hand, that there is a certain 
common  perspective  at  which  both  Didi  and  Naomi  intend  their  claims  to  be 
evaluated for truth value.11 In that case, they truly disagree. However, only one of the 
two will then be right. In other words, under this assumptions, we've got a hold on 
disagreement, but it is faultlessness that must now give out.   
Sect. III Faultless disagreement as forward-looking disagreement
In this final section, I want to look at the more promising side of Richard's proposal,  
and the idea that in between purely factual and merely verbal disagreements, there 
is an important class of disagreements that turn upon the fact that the concepts that 
they involve are still, as it were, under construction. As applied to Didi's and Naomi's 
case, the idea would be that they share a certain concept of richness, but this concept 
is still  underdetermined and does not specify whether a person with one million 
dollars falls under it or not. Since this might not be the most illuminating example, 
let me propose a different one, to illustrate the idea as I understand it. 
Suppose that Didi and Naomi are debating whether to hire Khaled. Didi says, 
"he has a strong publication record, with over 20 publications", and Naomi replies, 
"oh no, he has less than 20 publications." Suppose that Didi and Naomi know exactly 
what Khaled has written and published and where – in other words, they know all 
11 It is actually enough that Didi and Naomi presuppose that they have a shared perspective, and intend 
their claims to be evaluated at that perspective. For an account roughly along these lines, see e.g. 
López de Sa (2008).
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the relevant facts. Furthermore, let there be among Khaled's productions a number 
of online conference working papers, and suppose that when those are taken into 
account, he has more than 20 items, but not otherwise. Now, if Didi counts such 
working papers as "publications" while Naomi doesn't, then their disagreement turns 
precisely on the question of what one ought to count as a publication. To put it  
differently, the concept of a publication that they share does not yet determine by 
itself whether an online conference working paper should or shouldn't fall  in its 
extension. Given this indeterminacy, a practical issue will arise for Didi and Naomi 
(and, more generally, for their academic community) to decide whether or not to 
extend the concept of 'publication' in such a way as to include among its instances a 
certain kind of "new" objects, namely, online conference working papers, or not.12 
What  I  would like to suggest  is that the best  way of understanding Richard's 
constructive proposal is to consider Didi's and Naomi's disagreement whether Mary 
is rich as a case of practical disagreement over the issue of how to best construe and 
apply the concept of 'rich'.13 If we accept the idea of an underdetermined concept, 
then a disagreement that involves such a concept will easily turn out to be faultless. 
For, at the time of the disagreement, the concept's precise extension is not yet fully 
determined, and so neither of the parties is strictly speaking wrong. But note that 
even if, at the time of the dispute, the concept may be open-ended, and the two 
parties' claims, though in apparent contradiction, may be such that neither is false 
(since  neither  has  a  truth value  yet),  the  way  in  which the  concept  is  going to 
develop  will  make  it  possible  to  decide,  albeit  retrospectively,  which  of  the  two 
parties got it right.
Let me take stock. After having seen, in the previous section, that the relativist 
proposal on its own doesn't take us very far, we have turned to the contextualist 
ideas incorporated in Richard's view, and, in particular, the idea that the concepts 
themselves (some contextualists would say:  meanings  themselves) are continuously 
changing  and,  normally,  getting  more  precise.  In  this  picture,  when we  have  a 
concept such that its previous uses do not enable us to tell whether a given object 
12 To some, this may look like a sheer case of metalinguistic disagreement. However, although I do not 
deny that there may be a metalinguistic component involved, what matters is the difference with other 
cases of (arguably) metalinguistic disagreement, where people go into a dispute simply because they 
happen to attach different meanings to the words used – as would be, to take an extreme case, a dispute 
over the question whether Khaled lives near a bank, in which the one party intends to be talking about a 
river bank, and the other, about a financial institution.
13 The idea of linking the putative cases of faultless disagreement to those of practical disagreement 
has been floating in the air for some time now, and I am not sure to whom exactly it should be credited.
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falls under the concept or not, if one party says that it does and the other says that it  
doesn't, we will have disagreement, yet a faultless one, precisely because it is not yet  
determined whether we want the future uses of the concept to apply or not to the 
instance at stake. 
It should be noted that Richard himself does not put his point quite in the same 
terms; but I believe that the reconstruction that I am proposing does not distort his 
view either. Now, a further suggestion that I have advanced is that the two parties' 
claims are not to be viewed so much as truth-apt claims (to borrow Richard's term), 
but rather, as  proposals as to how to extend the future uses of the concept under 
debate. That is, a disagreement of this sort may be viewed, in a way, as a practical  
disagreement over  the issue of how to best extend, or precisify, a concept that is 
underdetermined. 
The last issue that I want to address is the question of what precisely makes 
such disagreements substantive. Richard's book is, in a way, deceiving, for when he 
comes to that very issue, he confesses that "all the hard work is yet to come” (p. 123). 
Of course, it would be unreasonable for me to hope to do any of that hard work in 
this paper, so what I simply want to do is point to a direction that may be worth 
exploring. What we have reached so far by following Richard's strategy (as I have 
proposed to reconstruct it) are two observations: (i) 'rich'  disagreements typically 
turn upon concepts that are shared but still open-ended, allowing for instances for 
which it is not yet determined whether they fall under the concept or not; (ii) faced 
with such instances, the users of the concept at stake will face a practical decision as 
to whether they should extend their use of the concept in such a way that it applies 
to the instance or not. In other words, we are led to the idea that 'rich' disagreements 
are a species of practical disagreements. Now, in reply to the substantivity issue, one 
might want to say that practical disagreements are substantive by their very nature. I 
don't think that this is a satisfactory reply, for it merely dodges the issue. Conversely,  
I don't think either that our reply in the specific case of 'rich' disagreements ought to 
extend to other cases of practical disagreement (even if it might). 
My own reply, albeit very tentative, is to say that even if, at the time of the 
dispute, it is not yet determined whether an instance falls under the concept or not, 
the way in which the concept evolves and gets sharpened will eventually make it 
possible to determine whether it does, and to decide, retrospectively, which of the 
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two parties was right.14
Two worries immediately come to mind. First, what about cases in which the 
disagreement results in there becoming two distinct concepts where there used to be 
a single underdetermined concept? Both parties will be right, yet their disagreement 
is  still  substantive.  Second,  what  about  cases  in  which  the  concept  never  gets 
sharpened in a way that determines whether a given instance falls under it or not? 
The first type of case would be one in which, in the previous example, we would end 
up with two concepts of a publication: a wide one that includes conference working 
papers, and a narrow one that doesn't; both Didi, claiming that Khaled had more 
than 20 publications, and Naomi, claiming that he didn't, would have then be right – 
under the relevant disambiguations of 'publication'. Note that such an outcome of 
their  dispute  would  bring  their  case  much closer  to  the  cases  of  metalinguistic 
disagreement.15 The second type of case, on the other hand, would make us wonder 
to which extent we should think of such a disagreement as being  substantive. Of 
course, this will turn on what we want from a disagreement to count as 'substantive'. 
How are we to think of a disagreement that, as the worry has it, can never ever get 
resolved in the future? Are there realistic cases of such disagreements? One sub-type 
of this sort of case would be a dispute involving an underdetermined concept such 
that some time following the dispute the concept goes out of existence without being 
relevantly sharpened. Past disputes among alchemists, for instance, are likely to be 
good candidates for this type of disagreement. In many such cases, I think, we would 
not want to view such disagreements as substantive (even if they were viewed as 
such by the disagreeing parties at the time of the dispute). Another sub-type of this 
sort of case would be disputes involving concepts that never go out of existence, but 
can never get sharpened either. Though we cannot know whether there will ever be 
any such concepts, and whether any of the concepts we have turn out to be such, we 
can still ask ourselves whether, under the hypothesis that a given dispute involves 
such a concept, we have a genuine disagreement. And it seems to me that to disagree 
over a concept that, by hypothesis, can never get sharpened, is not so different from 
being in a deadlock, in which true disagreement has given out.*   
14 If the suggestion that I am sketching, according to which 'rich' disagreements are tightly linked to the 
indeterminacy of the future (viz. of the way in which the concept at stake will evolve), is on the right 
track, that would lend support to MacFarlane's suggestion that the strongest case for relativism is that of  
the open future (see MacFarlane 2003).  
15 Note that metalinguistic disagreements themselves can be substantive, as emphasized, for instance, 
in Sosa (ms.) or in Sundell (2010).  
* I would like to thank Mark Richard for reading and responding to the paper, and Dunja Jutronic for 
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